This paper examines the behavior of Spanish siquiera, a scalar particle that always associates with minimal semantic values. As we will see in sections 2 and 3, siquiera is licensed in a number of downward entailing environments, in modal contexts, and in questions, where it triggers a negative bias, just like English even does when it associates with a minimal value. Section 1 surveys some relevant background on even and the bias that it triggers in questions. Guerzoni (2004) shows that the negative bias triggered by even can be captured by assuming that even is a low likelihood particle (Karttunen and Peters 1979). We will see in section 3 that the bias triggered by siquiera does not seem amenable to the same type of analysis. Section 4 concludes by sketching an analysis of siquiera inspired by the 'domain widening' theory of even presented in van Rooij 2003.
Even.
Since Karttunen and Peters 1979 , even is standardly analyzed as a presupposition trigger devoid of any truth-conditional content (Rooth 1985 , Wilkinson 1996 . Under this view, the sentence in (1), with focus on Bill, asserts that Bill likes Mary and conveys the 'low likelihood presupposition' that, of all relevant individuals, Bill is the least likely person to do so. If Polly and Molly were the individuals under consideration, even would contribute the presupposition that the proposition that Bill likes Mary is less likely than any of the alternative propositions in (2). 1
(1) Even BILL likes Mary. (Karttunen and Peters 1979: 11) (2) {that Polly likes Mary, that Molly likes Mary}
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1 Karttunen and Peters (1979) use the term 'conventional implicature' for what we would call today a presupposition. They claim that even also presupposes than at least one of the alternatives is true. Krifka (1991a ), von Stechow (1991 and Rullmann (1997) have challenged this claim. The claim that even conveys that the assertion is less likely than any of the alternatives or that it is the endpoint of a pragmatic scale (Fauconnier 1975) has also been challenged. Francescotti (1995) argues that even conveys that the assertion outranks most of the alternatives, and Kay (1990) that it is less likely than a contextually salient proposition.
The alternative propositions that the low likelihood presupposition makes reference to depend on the placement of focus. With focus on Mary, (3a) presupposes that Mary is the least likely person for Bill to give a book to: if the relevant individuals were Polly and Molly, even would convey that the proposition expressed by (3a) is less likely than any of the ones in (3b). With focus on a book, (3a) presupposes that a book is the least likely thing for Bill to give Mary: if the relevant presents were a ball and a doll, even would convey that the proposition expressed by (3a) is less likely than any of the ones in (3c). (3) a. Bill has even given Mary a book.
b. {that Bill has given Polly a book, that Bill has given Molly a book} c. {that Bill has given Mary a ball, that Bill has given Mary a doll}
Before proceeding any further, some explicit assumptions about even are in order. For the sake of concreteness, we will assume, as in Schwarz 2005 , that even is a focus-sensitive operator that takes two arguments: a covert free variable ranging over sets of propositions (written as a subscript C) and a proposition (its 'prejacent'). We will also assume that focused constituents are marked at LF by means of a subscript F. The LF of the sentence in (1) will then look as in (4):
To capture the focus sensitivity of even, we will assume an Alternative Semantics for focus (Rooth 1985 (Rooth , 1992 and impose the condition that the value of C has to be a subset of the focus value of the prejacent of even. In Rooth's framework, the focus value of a propositional constituent κ is the set of propositions that contains the proposition expressed by κ as well as all those propositions that can be obtained by replacing the focus-marked constituent in κ with any constituent of the same semantic type. The focus value of the prejacent of even in (4), then, is the set that contains any proposition of the form 'that x likes Mary.' Under these assumptions, we will say that the semantics maps the LF in (4) to the proposition that Bill likes Mary only when the conditions in (5) ii. C > c Bill likes Mary 2 The definedness conditions in (5b) are meant to capture the low likelihood component (Krifka 1995: 227) . The abbreviation 'p < c q' expresses that proposition p is less likely than proposition q, given the information in the common ground c (the information state that represents the shared beliefs of the parties involved in the conversation.) The condition in (5b-ii) makes sure that the common ground supports the possibility that all individuals under consideration like Mary but Bill doesn't. If, given the common ground information, it were true that if Bill likes Mary, then everybody else does too, the proposition that Bill likes Mary would not be truly unlikely.
Consider now the sentence in (6) below. With focus on Bill, (6) conveys the 'high likelihood' presupposition that Bill is the most likely person to like Mary. As illustrated in (7), there are two possible LFs for (6). Under the current analysis, LF  correctly requires Bill to be the most likely person to like Mary, because, under the scope of even, negation reverses the polarity of the low likelihood presupposition: assuming that (8) is the value of C, the low likelihood presupposition would require Bill to be less likely not to like Mary than Polly or Molly. Yet, since presuppositions survive embedding under negation (Karttunen 1973) , the interpretation of LF  should inherit the presuppositions of (4), and, so, contrary to fact, there should be a reading of (6) Karttunen and Peters (1979) endorse the view that even always conveys low likelihood and maintain that LF  is not well-formed because even is a positive polarity item. This analysis (from now on 'the Scope Theory') has been defended in Wilkinson 1996 , Guerzoni 2003 and Nakanishi 2006 , but it has also come under attack (see, for instance, Rooth 1985 , Rullmann 1997 , Herburger 2003 and Giannakidou 2007 .) Rooth (1985) observes that even conveys high likelihood in contexts where negative polarity items are licensed and proposes that the perceived low and high likelihood presuppositions correspond to two different (but homophonous) lexical items. Under this view (from now on 'the NPI theory'), (6) has the two LFs in (9): LF  contains a PPI that triggers a low likelihood presupposition, and LF  an NPI that triggers a high likelihood presupposition.
The analysis of the behavior of even in questions has recently been taken to provide indirect support for the Scope Theory (Guerzoni 2003 (Guerzoni , 2004 . Questions containing minimizers, like the ones in (10), cannot be used as disinterested information requests because they are 'negatively biased' -they convey that the speaker expects a negative answer (Borkin 1971 , Ladusaw 1980 . Questions containing even are similarly biased when even associates with a constituent that denotes a minimal value: in a context where Pedro is more likely to speak proper Spanish than proper French or Italian, the question in (11) signals that, contrary to what is expected, the speaker suspects that Pedro cannot speak proper Spanish.
(10) a. Does Charlie bat an eye when you threaten him? (Borkin 1971: 53) b. Did anyone lift a finger to help? (Ladusaw 1980: 186) (11) Pedro can't speak proper French. He can't speak proper Italian . . . Can he even speak proper Spanish? Guerzoni (2003 Guerzoni ( , 2004 shows that the Scope Theory can derive this bias. She assumes that yes/no questions contain a silent whether, which introduces a negation
In this derivation, the Q(uestion) operator creates a proto-question (Karttunen 1977) -it lifts the denotation of its sister from a proposition to a set of propositions, the type of questions. A silent whether makes sure that this set contains the denotation of the IP and its negation. This silent whether is analyzed as in (13): it denotes the characteristic function of the set containing the identity function over propositions and negation. It starts the derivation as the sister of the IP, but moves above Q for type reasons, leaving a trace of type st, st . The sister of the moved whether is interpreted by abstracting over that trace: it maps any function f of type st, st to the set containing the proposition that results from applying f to the denotation of the IP. Whether combines with this function via a generalized version of Karttunen's Wh-Quantification Rule (Karttunen 1977: 19) , yielding the set that contains the propositions that result from applying the denotation of the IP to the functions in the set whose characteristic function whether denotes.
Assuming that even is a propositional operator, this LF leaves two possible attachment sites for even -right above or right below the trace of whether. When even scopes under the trace of whether, the LF denotes the first set in (14). When even scopes over the trace of whether, the second. These sets share one proposition (the positive answer to the question), which results from applying even to the denotation of the IP. This proposition is defined only in worlds in which it is less likely than any of its alternatives, which are propositions of the form 'that Pedro can speak proper x' (assuming that Spanish is focused.) When even scopes under negation, as in the first set in (14), the negative answer to the question will inherit the presuppositions of the positive answer. When it scopes over the trace of whether, as in the second set in (14), the negative answer to the question will be defined only if the proposition that Pedro does not speak proper Spanish is less likely than any of the alternatives, which are propositions of the form 'that Pedro cannot speak proper x.' If we assume that Pedro is more likely to speak proper Spanish than any other contextually relevant language, none of the answers to the question in (11) will be defined when even scopes under the trace of whether. When even scopes over the trace of whether, only the negative answer will be defined. The bias, in this account, is due to the fact that the speaker utters a question with only one assertable answer -the negative.
The Scope Theory provides a very elegant account of the negative bias triggered by even, then. This raises a natural typological question: to what extent can this account derive the negative bias triggered by other scalar items in other languages? This paper contributes to answering this question by examining the behavior of Spanish siquiera, a high likelihood scalar particle.
Spanish Scalar Particles: Siquiera.
Spanish has a number of scalar particles: hasta, incluso, ni, and siquiera. Hasta and incluso convey low likelihood and are positive polarity items (Schwenter 2002) . Ni is a negative concord item (henceforth 'NCI') (Herburger 2003 ) that conveys high likelihood (the version of (15a) with ni is deviant if Pedro is not likely to speak Chinese.) Like other NCIs in Spanish, which is a 'non-strict' negative concord language, ni requires the preverbal negative marker no in unembedded episodic sentences when it occurs in postverbal position; in preverbal position, ni excludes no, as (15) illustrates. 3 Given its intimate connection with negation and its high likelihood component, one could be tempted to identify ni with Rooth's NPI even. However, the distribution of Spanish NCIs does not follow the distribution of English NPIs of the any type (Penka 2007) , and the distribution of ni doesn't either (Guerzoni 2004) : like other NCIs, ni is licensed under doubt or without, but not under factive emotives, in the antecedent of conditionals, the first argument of universal nominal quantifiers, or in questions. Ni frequently co-occurs with siquiera, as in (16). The addition of siquiera to ni does not seem to bring about any meaning change: just like (15a), (16) conveys (i) that Pedro does not speak Chinese, and (ii) that he is likely to do so. This is reminiscent of what happens when even is added to a minimizer in a negative context (Pott 1859 , Schmerling 1971 , Heim 1984 : the versions of (17) Since it frequently co-occurs with ni, it should not come out as a surprise that siquiera has only been discussed in the semantic literature in connection with this NCI (Herburger 2003 , Guerzoni 2004 ). However, as we have just seen, ni does not require siquiera and, as we will see next, siquiera does not require ni either. Siquiera is deviant in positive episodic sentences (both in preverbal and postverbal position, unlike ni), as (18) illustrates, but it is licensed in a variety of 'negative' environments, where it can occur without ni. The naturally occurring examples in (19) show that siquiera is licensed by sentential negation (19a), by preverbal NCIs (nadie, ningún, nunca) (19b), and under the scope of the 'negative' preposition sin ('without') (19c). These examples are arguably all cases where siquiera is licensed by sentential negation, since NCIs (both preverbal and postverbal) have been argued to be licensed by a covert form of sentential negation (Zeijlstra 2004 , Penka 2007 , which without constituents can host (Penka 2007: 58) . We also find siquiera under the scope of doubt (20), and apenas ('hardly') (21). (18 Minimizers, ni, and other NCIs are licensed in the contexts in (19-21). However, siquiera is also licensed in environments that allow for NPIs of the English any type (Krifka 1991b ) but exclude ni and other NCIs: the antecedent of conditionals (subjunctive (22), but also indicative), before (but not after) clauses (23), the standard clause of excessive (too) (but not of assecutive (enough)) constructions (24), and questions (matrix, as in (25) Finally, siquiera is licensed in a number of modal constructions where ni is not licensed: under the future tense (26), in imperatives (in requests and orders (27a), and also in offers (27b)), in optatives (often with the adverb ojalá 'I wish that', as in (28)), with necessity modals (tener que 'have to' (29a) or deber 'ought to' (29b)), and also with directive propositional attitudes (30). (26) In all these modal cases, siquiera naturally translates as at least (Bosque 1980: 166) . The contrast between the NPI contexts (where siquiera naturally translates as even) and the modal contexts (where it translates as at least) is reminiscent of the behavior of Greek esto, which sometimes translates as even, and sometimes as at least (Giannakidou 2007) . Like the concessive uses of at least described in Nakanishi and Rullmann (2009) , siquiera associates in these examples (like in the previous ones) with constituents that denote highly likely scalar values, and evokes a contrast with other more desirable alternatives. Consider, for instance, the example in (26) above: it can be naturally uttered in a scenario in which the speaker knows that she and Rusca will not eat good earthy food more than once per day, which would be more desirable. Likewise, the sentence in (27a) can be uttered by somebody convinced that the doctor will not give her more than a glass of water; it may be fine for the speaker of (28) if a substantial amount of the workers will not have responded the way she wants; (29a) is naturally uttered in a scenario in which the company does not have to pay more than 60% of the average salary; and (30) is compatible with the Conservatives being happy if the Eighth Title is not modified substantially.
Siquiera in Questions and the Scope Theory.
Having looked at the distribution of siquiera, we will now come back to its behavior in questions. The examples in (31) below show that, as we pointed out before, siquiera is licensed in questions, both matrix (31a) and embedded (31b): (31) We now note that these questions convey a negative bias. They are not appropriate in contexts in which the speaker suspects that their true answer is positive. Consider, for instance, (32a). While this question allows for tags like verdad or no ('right?') that indicate a positive bias -that the speaker is seeking to confirm her belief that her addressee did in fact attemp to try out the solutions -its counterpart with siquiera does not. Similarly, (32b) is compatible both with a parenthetical that conveys that the speaker suspects that the true answer is positive and with one that conveys that he suspects that it is negative. Its counterpart with siquiera, however, is deviant with the former. In questions, like in declarative sentences, siquiera conveys that its prejacent is likely. It also signals that the issue is settled for the alternative (less likely) propositions. Consider, for instance, (31a), which is taken from an internet computer user forum post. The author of the post is complaining about his addressee asking for help, because he thinks that his problem could have been solved by carrying out the solutions that other users already suggested. He believes that his addressee has not carried out those solutions, since he would not be asking for help otherwise. By using siquiera, he signals that he also believes that his addresse did not do something easier: at least attempt to give these solutions a try. In (31b) siquiera behaves in a similar way. The sentence in (31b) is part of a response to a post by "the iconoclast." The author of (31b) infers from the choice of nickname that his addressee claims to be an iconoclast. He thinks he is not. The use of siquiera signals that he suspects that he does not have the weaker property of knowing what an iconoclast is.
We have seen in section 1 that the Scope Theory provides a very elegant account of the negative bias triggered by even when it associates with likely prejacents (Guerzoni 2004) . However, this account does not directly carry over to siquiera. The reason why this is so has to do with the environments in which siquiera is licensed. The Scope Theory analyzes even as a low likelihood scalar particle -when even conveys high likelihood, it is because it outscopes a polarity reversing expression at LF. The analysis of the negative bias of even is based on this assumption: in questions, when even associates with a likely prejacent, it can still outscope the (implicit) negation in the negative answer and convey a satisfiable presupposition. To extend the analysis to siquiera, then, we need to analyze this scalar particle as a low likelihood item. Since siquiera always seems to convey high likelihood, we are also forced to assume that it always scopes over a polarity reversing operator. This assumption is problematic: it may turn out to be true for some, but not for all of the environments in which siquiera is licensed, since, as we saw in the previous section, siquiera is licensed in upward entailing environments, like the nuclear scope of necessity modals.
For the sake of illustration, let us assume that siquiera is a low likelihood focus sensitive propositional operator, as in (33):
Let us now consider the sentence in (34) Consider first (35a). The prejacent of siquiera in (35a) is the proposition that Pedro goes swimming at least once per week -the sentence in (34) does not claim that Pedro's doctor wants him to go swimming exactly once per week. Assuming that una vez por semana 'once per week' is focused, the domain of quantification of siquiera in (35a) should be (a subset of) (36): (36) {Pedro goes swimming at least two days per week, Pedro goes swimming at least three days per week . . . } Under the current analysis, the LF in (35a) should then presuppose that, given the common ground information, the proposition that Pedro goes swimming at least once per week is less likely than any of the alternative propositions in (36). All the alternative propositions in (36) asymmetrically entail the prejacent of siquiera. The relation < c relates to semantic strenght as follows: if propositions p and q are comparable in their semantic strength -if either p entails q or q entails p -then if p < c q, we can conclude that p asymmetrically entails q (because for p to be less likely than q, given the common ground information, there should be less worlds in the common ground in which p is true than worlds in which q is, so the common ground should allow for worlds in which q is true but p isn't, but it should not allow for worlds in which p is true but q isn't) (Krifka 1995: 228) . This means that under the analysis in (35a), the sentence in (34) should not be defined for any common ground, because it could only be defined for common grounds that allow for worlds in which, for any n > 1, Pedro goes swimming at least n times but not at least once. Scoping siquiera over the necessity modal does not give us the right presupposition either. Under the LF in (35b), siquiera requires the proposition that Pedro is required to go swimming once per week to be less likely, given the common ground information, that any of the propositions in the set below:
(37) {Pedro has to go swimming at least two days per week, Pedro has to go swimming at least three days per week . . . } Yet, the sentence in (34) can be appropriately uttered in a scenario where it is taken for granted that it is false that Pedro's doctor requires him to go swimming more often than once per week, and where, therefore, the likelihood of the alternatives is zero. Of course, in positive episodic sentences, like (38) below, siquiera cannot outscope a polarity reversal expression either. If we assume the low likelihood analysis, siquiera should still be able to combine with unlikely prejacents. This, however, does not seem to be the case: the sentence in (38) below is deviant even in a context where the dean is the most unlikely relevant person to come to the department party. We need a way to derive the negative bias of siquiera that does not hinge upon the assumption that this scalar item contributes low likelihood. In the next section, we will sketch one, largely inspired by the domain widening analysis of even put forth in van Rooij 2003, and the extremity condition imposed by minimizers in Krifka 1995.
Settledness, Minimality and Extremity.
We will continue to assume that siquiera takes two arguments: a covert free variable ranging over sets of propositional alternatives, and a proposition (its 'prejacent.') For the sake of illustration, we will also assume, as before, that focus brings about the alternatives and determines their shape, and we will continue to take for granted an alternative semantics for focus (Rooth 1985 (Rooth , 1992 , under which expressions have both an ordinary ( · o ) and a focus semantic value ( · f ).With this setup in mind, we put forth the hypothesis that siquiera imposes two requirements: the first, which we will call "minimality", requires the prejacent to be weaker than any of the alternatives, and the second, which I take from Krifka's analysis of minimizers (Krifka 1995: 239) and call, following him, "extremity", requires that it be taken for granted that, in all natural common grounds, the proposition that if the prejacent is true, then no other alternative is true as well should not be more likely than the proposition that if the prejacent is true, then some other alternative is true as well. 6 (39) a. Where φ o,w ∈ D s,t , siquiera C φ f,g and siquiera C φ ] o,w,g are defined iff the conditions in (i-iii) below are all met:
i. Focus restriction:
iii.Extremity: it holds in w that for any natural common ground c,
When defined, siquiera C φ f,g = C, and siquiera C φ o,w,g = φ o,w,g As in Krifka's alternative semantics for NPIs (Krifka 1995) , we will assume that the alternatives grow to the top, where they are accessed by a covert speech act operator that contrasts the prejacent with all other alternatives. Following van Rooij (2003) analysis of even, we will assume that this operator, which we will call 'OP-EVEN ASSERT ', for lack of a better name, requires the alternatives to be all settled in the common ground, i.e. to be either true or false, as ilustrated in (40) below. As in regular assertions, both the prejacent and its negation are required to be compatible with the common ground. The intuition behind the settledness condition is that siquiera conveys domain widening: (i) it signals that the issue of whether they are true or false is settled for all propositions in the domain containing the alternatives, and (ii) it puts forth the claim that that issue is also settled for all propositions in the wider domain that includes the prejacent.
Let us now consider (41). Suppose that the relevant alternatives are propositions of the form 'that Pedro swam at least n times' (where n > 1) -these alternatives satisfy minimality, assuming that the prejacent is the proposition that Pedro swam at least once. Given the definedness conditions of OP-EVEN ASSERT , for (41a) to be defined, all these alternatives must be taken to be either true or false. If it were common knowledge that Pedro swam at least twice, it would have to be common knowledge that he swam at least once. In that case, (41a) would already be entailed by the common ground, and, hence, it would not be assertable. We conclude that the common ground should entail that Pedro did not swim twice or more often: if Pedro swam at least once, he did so exactly once. For (41a) to be assertable, there should be worlds in the common ground in which Pedro did not swim, and worlds in which he did so at least once -only once, in fact, given the settledness condition. Given this situation, however, updating the common ground with the information provided by (41) would result in a non natural common ground that would entail that Pedro swam only once, and, thus, violate extremity. We will entertain the hypothesis that this is the reason behind the deviance of (41), following the type of logic that Krifka (1995) Let us discuss LF  first. Given the scope of siquiera, we can assume that, as before, the relevant alternatives are propositions of the form 'that Pedro swam at least n times' (for n > 1). At the focus semantic level, these alternatives combine pointwise with negation. The alternatives that the definition of OP-EVEN ASSERT makes reference to are then propositions of the form 'that Pedro did not swim at least n times' (for n > 1). OP-EVEN ASSERT requires all these alternatives to be either true or false. If they were false, the proposition expressed by (42a) (that Pedro did not swim at least once) would not be compatible with the common ground, and, hence, it would not be assertable. It must be the case, then, that the alternatives that OP-EVEN ASSERT sees are all known to be true. Pedro is then known not to have swum twice or more than twice. For (42b) to be assertable, the common ground must be compatible both with the proposition that Pedro did not swim and with its negation -the proposition that he swam at least once. Since Pedro is known not to have swum twice or more often, for (42b) to be assertable, either Pedro didn't swim or he swam only once, a minimal value. The input common ground is a non-natural one, given the extremity condition. Asserting the proposition expressed by (42c) eliminates the possibility that Pedro swam only once, yielding a common ground that satisfies the extremity condition. As for LF  , its definedness conditions are different. Given its scope in (42c), siquiera would need to invoke alternatives of the form 'that Pedro did not swim n times' that would asymmetrically entail 'that Pedro did not swim at least once.' Even if such alternatives existed, for (42c) to be assertable, we would need to assume that they are all false, and, so, the output common ground would violate the extremity condition.
Let us go back briefly to the modal sentence in (34). Given our current assumptions, there are also two possible LFs for this sentence, depending on the scope of siquiera relative to the modal, as illustrated in (43a-43b) below. Under the first analysis, in (43a), siquiera requires alternatives of the form 'that Pedro swims at least n times' (for n > 1). These combine pointwise at the focus semantic level with the modal operator to yield a set of propositional alternatives of the form of 'that Pedro is required to swim at least n times' (for n > 1). OP-EVEN ASSERT requires all these alternatives to be settled in the common ground. Since they are all stronger than the assertion, we can conclude that they must be false, and, so, the sentence is correctly predicted to be assertable in a context, like the one that we entertained before, in which they are indeed false. Extremity simply makes sure that it is common knowledge that Pedro is less likely to go swimming only once than more often. As before, the reader can verify that LF  is associated with an assertion whose output common ground sistematically violates extremity. Once the current setup is extended to yes/no questions, the negative bias can be derived as a way of avoiding a violation of extremity. To see how, let us assume, again, that the focal alternatives that siquiera constrains grow to the top, where they are accessed by a covert speech act operator that, in analogy with the case of assertions, asks whether the prejacent is true or false in case all the alternatives that siquiera operates over are known to be true or false. As illustrated below, we assume that a yes/no question maps a common ground c into a set containing the set of world-assignment pairs in c where the prejacent is true, and the set of worldassignment pairs in c where the prejacent is false (Krifka 1995: 253) . An answer to the question is felicitous if it eliminates one of the elements in that set. )(c) = {{ w, g ∈ c| φ o,w,g (w) = }, { w, g ∈ c| φ o,w,g (w) = }} Let us consider the question in (45). We will assume, again, that siquiera requires alternatives of the form 'that Pedro swam at least n times' (for n > 1). OP-EVEN Q YES/NO requires all these alternatives to be either true or false in the common ground. For the question in (45) to be uttered felicitously, we can assume that the issue of whether Pedro swam at least once is not entailed by the common ground. This means that we need to assume that all the alternatives are false, and that that the common ground entails that either Pedro didn't swim or that he swam only once. This is a question about whether a truly minimal value holds. The partition that the question performs contains two common grounds: one entails that Pedro swam only once, and the other entails that Pedro did not swim. In answering the question, the hearer needs to choose between these two possible common grounds. By answering with a positive answer, the hearer chooses a common ground that entails that Pedro only swam once, and by answering with a negative answer, one that entails that Pedro didn't swim. The first common ground violates extremity, but the second doesn't. Since it is being taken for granted that a common ground that violates extremity is not a natural one, the speaker can expect the hearer to choose the negative answer. We have surveyed a number of environments where siquiera is licensed and pointed out that this particle conveys a negative bias in questions. We have seen that Guerzoni (2004) provides an elegant analysis of the bias triggered by even in questions when it associates with a minimal value. Since this analysis hinges on the assumption that this particle lexically conveys low likelihood, it can be taken to provide indirect evidence for the Scope Theory of even. Extending this analysis to siquiera is tempting. However, we have seen that siquiera is licensed in non downward entailing environments, where it does not seem possible to assume that its lexical entry conveys low likelihood. As an alternative, we have sketched an analysis under which siquiera invokes alternatives that are stronger than the assertion and requires that the proposition that only the prejacent is true should not be more likely than the proposition that the prejacent and some alternative is true. In this analysis, the alternatives introduced by siquiera interact with a speech act operator that imposes a settledness condition. We have seen the effects of this condition in the case of assertions and direct (yes/no) questions. It still remains to be seen how other speech acts may be treated. A particularly pressing question is what happens with siquiera in indirect questions, where, as we have seen, it also triggers a negative bias. This question may be addressed by exploiting a suggestion made in passing by Krifka (1995: 255) , who suggests that the semantics of sentences containing indirect questions may convey the felicity conditions of the corresponding direct questions. I hope to address the issue in future work.
